Public spending reallocations and economic growth across different income levels by Acosta-Ormaechea, Santiago & Morozumi, Atsuyoshi
Public spending reallocations and economic growth
across different income levels
Santiago Acosta-Ormaechea
International Monetary Fund ∗
Atsuyoshi Morozumi
University of Nottingham †
July 15, 2016
Abstract
This paper examines the effects of public spending reallocations on economic growth.
Assembling a disaggregated public spending dataset of 83 countries over the 1970-2011
period, we show that spending reallocations towards education, from health and social
protection, have significant growth-promoting effects across a wide range of countries’
income levels. However, income heterogeneity matters, particularly when reallocations
involve infrastructure spending. Specifically, a reallocation from this spending to edu-
cation also promotes growth, albeit primarily when the income level is low. This occurs
because the effects of infrastructure spending are particularly weak in low-income coun-
tries, possibly due to the low quality of governance.
Keywords: Public spending reallocation, Economic growth, Education spending, In-
frastructure spending, Income heterogeneity, Governance quality JEL: O43, H50, O11
∗Tel: +1 202 623 7391. 1919 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington DC 20006, USA. Email: SAcostaOr-
maechea@imf.org.
†Corresponding author. Tel: +44 115 84 67847. School of Economics & CFCM, University of Nottingham,
University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK. Email: Atsuyoshi.Morozumi@nottingham.ac.uk.
1
1 Introduction
Can a government promote long-run growth by changing the composition of public spending
while keeping the total level fixed? For example, is there a room for a rise in public education
spending to foster growth, when it is financed by a fall in other spending items, such as
defense, health, social protection and infrastructure spending? Answering these questions
is important at least for two reasons. First, even when high levels of public indebtedness
prevent a government from raising the level of public spending in several years to come (as is
often the case in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-09), a government may still seek
to promote growth by reallocating spending components. Second, when facing an expected
rise in health and social protection spending amid ongoing population aging, governments
may need to decide which other types of spending to cut over the next few decades, while
still trying to preserve growth.1
Various previous studies shed light on this important policy question. For example, Barro
(1990) theoretically shows that if a government increases ‘utility-enhancing’ public consump-
tion while reducing ‘production-enhancing’ spending, growth rates fall regardless of the level
of total spending.2 However, as theoretical studies often classify spending in a relatively
abstract manner (e.g., utility-enhancing spending), concrete policy implications are often
difficult to draw. Empirically, Devarajan et al. (1996), for example, find that a spending
reallocation towards economic infrastructure is associated with slower growth, particularly
in developing countries.3 However, because these previous empirical works normally do not
clarify which specific spending component is used as a financing item (i.e., a component for
which spending is decreased, to keep the level of total spending constant), their policy impli-
cations may still be limited. In short, the literature has not yet clarified how a government
1Clements et al. (2012), for example, discuss the expected increasing trends in health and pension spending
in advanced and developing countries over the long run.
2Age´nor (2010), also theoretically, shows that a spending reallocation toward public infrastructure from
‘unproductive’ spending can help increase growth rates, if public investment is sufficiently efficient.
3Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008), using data from 15 developing countries, show that a reallocation towards
capital spending has a negative effect on growth.
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could potentially promote growth through specific spending reallocations. The objective of
this paper is to fill this gap.
Importantly, however, even when certain specific spending reallocations promote growth
in one country, they may not have the same positive effects in others. For instance, Pritchett
(2000) argues that infrastructure spending in developing countries can be particularly unpro-
ductive, because government officials, often unconstrained in institutions of low quality, may
be allowed to pursue their private rents in the public infrastructure management.4 This im-
plies that for all else equal, a reallocation towards this spending item may not foster growth
in these countries.5 More generally, Gemmell et al. (2013) point out that private production
requires different types of public inputs depending on countries’ development levels, imply-
ing the potentially heterogeneous growth effects of spending reallocations. Overall, therefore,
we pay particular attention to the potential role of countries’ income levels in the spending
reallocations-growth nexus.
To proceed, we first assemble a disaggregated public spending dataset. Based on the
IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) Yearbook, it covers the functional components
including defense, health, social protection, education, and transport and communication, for
83 countries from different income levels over the 1970-2011 period.6 One key innovation
of this dataset is that, to address the potential importance of spending decentralization
movements in certain spending items such as health and education, it has a version which
utilizes not only central government (CG) level-, but also general government (GG) level-
data.7 We then examine the growth effects of various spending reallocations across different
4Keefer and Knack (2007) find that the level of capital spending increases in the worsening of governance
quality, suggesting that this type of spending may be unproductive in countries with poor governance. Given
that infrastructure spending is largely capital intensive, their finding relates to Pritchett (2000).
5Although Devarajan et al. (1996) show the growth-retarding effect of infrastructure spending (without
specifying its financing item), their reasoning is different. Their argument is that the negative effect is
attributed to the excessive use of this type of spending in developing countries, not necessarily highlighting
the quality of this spending.
6The list of the 83 countries is given in the Online Appendix A.
7To explain briefly, we would ideally like to use only GG-level data, because it is more comprehensive,
covering the local/state government levels, as well as the CG level. However, GG-level data are generally
much scarcer than CG-level data and it is unfeasible to conduct analyses based solely on it. Thus, this
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income levels. Notably, we address potential endogeneity concerns in various ways. First, we
address fiscal variables’ association with business cycles by basing the analyses mainly on an
8-year framework, yielding 5 observations per country at maximum.8 Second, we mitigate
reverse causality issues by adopting a lag structure of public spending variables. Third,
we tackle other potential endogeneity issues by using the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) dynamic panel data estimation approach.9
Our main results are summarized as follows. First, considering the growth effects of spend-
ing reallocations without taking account of income heterogeneity across countries, we show
that reallocations towards education, specifically from health and social protection spend-
ing, exhibit a particularly robust growth-promoting effect. However, we find that income
heterogeneity matters in the spending reallocations-growth nexus, particularly when infras-
tructure spending (proxied by transport and communications) is involved. Specifically, while
the above-mentioned reallocations towards education tend to promote growth across a wide
range of income levels, reallocations away from infrastructure spending, to items including
education, also foster growth, albeit primarily when the income level is low. What hap-
pens is that while the growth-promoting effects of education spending prevail independent
of income levels, the effects of infrastructure spending exhibit a distinctly positive associa-
tion with them. Evidence suggests that in line with Pritchett (2000), this particularly weak
growth-promoting effect of infrastructure spending in low-income countries may be driven by
the low quality of governance, as often observed in these countries. For instance, if political
officeholders are not properly constrained, the effectiveness of infrastructure spending may
particularly suffer in these countries, because this type of spending, being capital intensive,
tends to be a convenient vehicle for rent seeking.10
version of the dataset adopts a hybrid approach, replacing CG-level with GG-level data, particularly when
the degree of spending decentralization is known to be high in a country. Details are explained below.
8We also consider a 5-year frameworks in robustness checks.
9This approach is developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Blundell and
Bond (1998).
10While acknowledging that the low quality of governance can also be a problem for education spending,
the fact that this type of spending, largely comprising teachers’ wage payments, is often predetermined
outside officials’ discretion means that there may be less room for their rent-seeking behavior.
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In the literature, several previous works identify the key channels through which dif-
ferent spending items may affect growth. For example, theoretical models by Glomm and
Ravikumar (1997) and Blankenau and Simpson (2004) suggest that public education spend-
ing may foster growth through promoting human capital accumulation. Aı´sa and Pueyo
(2006) and Age´nor (2010) show that health spending can also promote growth by enhancing
life expectancy, making agents more patient, and thus encouraging private saving. Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2004) argue that defense spending fosters private investment and thus growth
by enhancing entrepreneurs’ property rights. Further, studies such as Turnovsky and Fisher
(1995) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) show that infrastructure spending can promote
private firms’ productivity and thus growth, albeit with the caveats indicated by Pritchett
(2000) for developing countries. Notice, therefore, that with each spending appearing to have
a growth-promoting potential on its own, it is not obvious, a priori, which spending item
is more growth promoting.11 In this regard, this paper adds to the literature by empiri-
cally studying reallocation effects, i.e., practically comparing the effects of different spending
items, across different income levels.
Further, several studies examine the growth effects of public spending for different fi-
nancing sources, including a rise in revenue or budget deficits, rather than spending real-
locations. For instance, Kneller et al. (1999), using a panel of 22 OECD countries over the
1970-95 period, find that a rise in ‘productive’ expenditure financed by an equal rise in ‘non-
distortionary’ taxes promotes growth, whereas a rise in ‘unproductive’ expenditure, coupled
with a rise in ‘distortionary’ taxes, reduces growth. Bose et al. (2007), using a panel of 30 de-
veloping countries during the 1970s and 1980s, show that a rise in education spending, offset
by non-tax revenue, is associated with higher growth, while a rise in transport spending is
not. Meanwhile, Gupta et al. (2005), focusing on 39 developing countries during the 1990s,
show that a rise in capital spending has a positive effect on growth, when financed through
11Even social protection spending may promote growth by itself. For instance, Lambrecht et al. (2005)
show that in cases where parents do not leave bequests to their children, social security spending can enhance
growth, in contrast to cases where parents leave bequests.
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budget deficits, but that a rise in current spending, particularly wages, has the opposite
effect. While these studies can be seen as parallel with this paper, a spending reallocation
could often be a more viable policy option. This is because securing a given financing through
revenue may not be straightforward, due to the elusive relationship between tax rates and
tax revenue (as reflected in the Laffer curve), while deficit financing may be implausible for
many countries in the face of high levels of indebtedness.12
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset.
Section 3 explains our empirical methodology and Section 4 presents regression results.
Lastly, Section 5 presents concluding remarks.
2 The Dataset
2.1 Construction of the dataset
Classification of public spending To conduct analyses on public spending reallocations
and growth, we assemble a new disaggregated public spending dataset. Based on historical
data reported in the IMF’s GFS Yearbook between 1970 and 2011, it classifies public expen-
diture according to its function.13 One innovation of this dataset is to bridge methodological
changes caused by the introduction of the new GFS manual (GFSM2001) from mid 1990s to
the early 2000s.14 In particular, realizing that GFSM2001 divides total spending into 10 ma-
jor functional categories, while the old manual, GFSM1986, divides them into 14 categories
(see Wickens (2002) for details), we re-categorize spending items under GFSM1986 into the
12See Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), for example, for a recent examination of Laffer curves for different taxes.
13Disaggregation of public spending can also be based on economic classification, with expenditure allo-
cated by its economic characteristics such as wages, subsidies, social benefits, and capital spending. However,
because detailed disaggregation following this classification tends to reduce the sample size drastically, this
paper focuses on the functional classification instead.
14The exact years of migration to the GFSM2001 differ depending on the country.
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items defined by GFSM2001, to make the unified series comparable.15,16 While following the
GFSM2001 categorization, however, we do not attempt to cover all the 10 major compo-
nents, because data on some of the components are quite scarce. Specifically, our dataset
covers the following 8 of them: general public services; defense; economic affairs; housing and
community amenities; health; recreation, culture, and religion; education; and social protec-
tion.17 Among these, we highlight, largely in accordance with the literature, the following 5
components: defense; transport and communication (transport, for short), a part of economic
affairs; health; education; and social protection, while combining the rest of spending into one
component (i.e., the remaining three major items and the rest of economic affairs). To note,
since data on transport spending, being a subcomponent itself, are sometimes unavailable
even when data on economic affairs are available, we do not disaggregate economic affairs
unless the reallocation under consideration involves a change in this spending.
Institutional coverage of the government As another notable innovation, we create
two versions of the dataset, differing in terms of coverage of the government level. To ex-
plain, note first that under GFSM1986, countries report data at most at the consolidated
central government (CG) level, whereas under GFSM2001, they provide data not only at the
CG level, but often at the consolidated general government (GG) level, which also covers
state and local government levels.18 With our aim of constructing long data series unifying
GFSM1986 and 2001, the first version of the dataset uses data only at the consolidated CG
level. However, it is important to realize that spending in certain functional components
such as health and education is heavily decentralized in some countries, rendering CG-level
15Admittedly, the unification process is not exact, but approximate, primarily due to the change in the
form in which governments report statistics, from the predominant use of a cash basis under GFSM1986
to the recommended use of an accrual basis under GFSM2001, resulting in the coexistence of both bases
under the latter manual. (Under an accrual basis, flows are recorded at the times that transactions occur,
independently of the flow of cash; under a cash basis, transactions are recorded when cash effectively flows.)
16When it happens that spending data is reported based on both accrual and cash bases under GFSM2001,
we use the data on the former basis, as it is economically more relevant.
17The two remaining, relatively small, items are public order and safety, and environmental protection.
18When the data for the different government units are consolidated, statistics are presented as if they
constituted a single unit, netting out transfers among them.
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data a poor proxy for more comprehensive GG-level data. To address this, we assemble the
second version of the dataset. Briefly, the idea is that while using CG-level data as a base,
we replace it with GG-level data, if the country’s public finances are known to be highly
decentralized. Specifically, we take the following procedure: 1) we calculate, to the extent
the data are available, the ratios of spending at the CG- to GG-levels under GFSM2001
for all the individual components covered in our analyses (as explained above) and take
country-level averages; 2) if the average ratio is less than 50 percent, even in one of these
spending items for a country, we abandon the entire CG-level data available for this country
and instead use the available GG-level data; 3) while GG-level data under GFSM2001 is
used in such cases, when the OECD provides larger GG-level data series, we instead use the
data from this alternative source.19,20 Overall, this alternative dataset, though smaller due
to the relative scarcity of GG-level data in general, is less susceptible to the effects from pos-
sible decentralization movements. In what follows, the first version of the dataset is denoted
CG-based, while the second is CG-GG-based.
2.2 Description of the dataset
Table 1 presents the dataset used in the subsequent regression analyses. They follow an 8-
year framework, i.e., 1972-1979, 1980-1987, ... , 2004-2011 (thus yielding 5 observations per
country at maximum), where all the public spending items take the initial values in each
period.21 The purpose of taking this measure is threefold. First, compared with the frame-
work comprising annual data, this setup is less prone to business cycle effects on spending
components (e.g., a possible rise in unemployment benefits in recessionary periods). Second,
19In robustness tests, we use another dataset with the CG/GG ratio threshold value of 75 percent.
20Since the OECD follows the same functional classification as GFSM2001, their data are comparable.
21While we examine below a 5-year framework too, we prefer a 8-year framework as a baseline. This is
primarily because, 5 years may be too short to capture the effects of certain spending such as education
spending (on primary/secondary school). This choice of period length is in line with, for example, Bleaney
et al. (2001), who, using a sample of OECD countries during 1970-95, show that eight annual lags are
required to fully account for the long-run effects of fiscal policy on growth. Nonetheless, it is important to
acknowledge that using 8-years averages is not without issues: in particular, it may not be the most suitable
way of addressing business cycle effects, since 8 years may be too long for the length of business cycles.
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the lag structure, focusing on the initial spending values, helps mitigate reverse causality is-
sues. For example, it is unlikely that governments’ anticipation of higher future growth rates
over the next 8 years prompts a change in the spending share of education in the current
period. Third, this structure squares with the apparent reality that public spending tends
to have delayed effects on growth. Before describing this dataset, one clarification about the
lag structure is in order. That is, to deal with the fact that disaggregated spending data is
unbalanced, we calculate initial spending figures by taking an average over certain years, as
long as at least one observation is available over these years. In reference analyses below, we
form initial spending by taking an average over 4 years up to the initial year of each period,
i.e., for the 1980-87 period, for example, an average is taken over 1977-1980.22,23
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
CG-based dataset CG-GG-based dataset
Variable Mean S.d. Min. Max. Mean S.d. Min. Max.
Growth rate (over 8 years) 18.7 17.8 −41.4 66.1 18.1 18.6 −41.4 66.1
Total spend/GDP 27.4 10 8.8 54.8 28.7 11.6 8.8 62.3
Defense/Total spend 9.7 7.4 0.8 39 9.7 7.9 0.7 39
Transport/Total spend 5.9 3.4 0.8 19.5 6.2 3.4 0.2 19.5
Health/Total spend 7.9 5 0.7 23.5 8.8 4.9 0.9 23.5
Educ/Total spend 11.7 6.1 1 29.6 13.5 5.7 1 29.6
Soc prot/Total spend 25 16 0.8 62.2 23.2 15.7 0.8 62.2
Rest/Total spend 39.9 13.7 13.9 82.4 38.6 14.1 13.9 80.7
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 9.1 1 6 10.9 9 1.1 6 10.9
Initial level of schooling 7.5 3.1 0.4 13.4 7.3 3.2 0.4 13.4
Investment/GDP 22.2 4.7 8.6 40.9 22.2 4.9 8.6 40.9
Population growth 1.2 1.2 −1.6 6.4 1.3 1.2 −1.6 6.4
Note: Statistics for CG- and CG-GG-based datasets are based on 206 and 180 observations from 82 countries.
All the fiscal variables are the initial values in each 8-year period. The Initial GDP p.c. is the log of 2005
US$ per capita. Initial level of schooling years are the average years of schooling for population aged between
25 and 64. Investment share and population growth rates are averages over an 8-year period. The figures
except for initial GDP and schooling years are in percent.
22For the first period only, we take an average over 3 years, i.e., 1970-72, because the data starts in 1970.
23Considering, for example, 3- or 5-year averages yields similar results below. In general, however, when
the period length becomes too short, the sample becomes too small for analyses, while when it is too long,
consistency across periods can be lost easily. (For example, with 6-year averages, with an extreme case, the
initial value for the 1980-87 period may be the one in 1975, while the one for the 1972-79 period may be the
one in 1972, yielding a gap of only 3 years.)
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Table 1 presents the summary statistics, corresponding to the reference analyses below.
For brevity, it focuses on the case where transport spending, a subcomponent of economic
affairs, is available. Ensuring the availability of all the spending items of interest, the final
CG- (CG-GG-) based datasets contain 206 (180) observations from 82 countries.24 Starting
with spending variables in the CG-based dataset, the share of total spending in GDP is
27.4 percent on average.25 The total is then divided into the respective components of our
particular interest. For instance, the mean values of health and education spending shares
in the total are 7.9 and 11.7 percent, respectively. The average growth rate is 18.7 percent
over the 8 years, corresponding to an annual growth rate of about 2.3 percent. Further, the
table covers the other explanatory variables, including initial GDP, initial level of schooling,
investment relative to GDP, and population growth rates, whose rationale is commented
below.26 Turning to the CG-GG-based dataset, the key difference is found in the different
spending shares of certain spending items. Specifically, consistent with the well-known facts
that health and education components are often particularly decentralized, these shares in
the CG-GG dataset are noticeably larger, i.e., 8.8 and 13.5 percent, respectively.
3 Empirical Specification and Methodology
3.1 Empirical specification
Our empirical specification is motivated by neoclassical growth models. The models generally
relate the growth of real GDP per capita to two types of variables: state and control/
environmental (control, for short) variables (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)). The former
variables describe the initial position of the economy, whereas the latter determine the steady
24In case transport spending is not disaggregated, the number of observations is 213 (185), for CG- (CG-
GG-) based datasets, from 83 countries.
25Because the dataset does not cover public order and safety, and environmental protection (due to the
severely limited data availability), this total spending figure does not equal the actual total. However, since
they generally account for small shares, this figure still approximately equals the actual total.
26Detailed data sources of the variables are found in the Online Appendix B.
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state. A key prediction of such models is that when the initial position of the economy is
controlled for, an increase in steady state output leads to higher growth rates during the
seemingly long adjustment period towards the steady state.27 Based on this prediction, we
examine how public spending reallocations affect the steady state and thus the growth of
real GDP, while assessing the role of countries’ income levels.28
Formally, we consider the following regression model:
yi,t−yi,t−x = αyi,t−x+βhi,t−x+
m∑
j=1
γjsi,j,t−x+
m∑
j=1
ζjsi,j,t−xyi,t−x+δei,t−x+z¯′i,tη+νi+ξt+i,t, (1)
where with the 8-year framework, t = 1979, 87, . . . , 2011 and x = 8. On the left-hand side
(LHS), yi,t (yi,t−x) is the log of real GDP per capita in country i in year t (year t − x).
Explanatory variables on the right-hand side (RHS) include initial real GDP per capita, yi,t−x,
and initial average years of schooling, hi,t−x, as state variables. The former is a convergence
variable, while the latter proxies initial human capital. Turning to control variables, si,j,t−x
represents the share of a public spending component, j, in total spending. As explained,
spending variables also take initial values. We then have interaction terms between the
spending shares and initial GDP per capita. Next, we control for the ratio of total spending
to GDP, ei,t−x, to focus on analyses on the growth effects of the composition of spending
(as in Devarajan et al. (1996)). Further, motivated by the Solow growth model, z¯i,t include
additional control variables such as investment rates and population growth rates, as their
27The steady state growth rate is determined exogenously in these growth models.
28Endogenous growth models also predict that fiscal policies play a role in the determination of growth
rates. For example, they can indicate that the share of ‘productive’ government spending to GDP directly
determines the long-run GDP per capita growth rate (e.g., Barro (1990)). However, because neoclassical
models naturally assign the role of income levels through convergence effects, and this characteristic, in turn,
facilitates us to examine the role of income levels in the effects of public spending reallocations through an
interaction approach (as seen below), we regard neoclassical growth models as a more suitable theoretical
foundation for our analyses.
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period-averaged values.29,30 νi captures unobserved country-specific effects, while ξt is a time
dummy, reflecting international shocks during each period.
With Eq. 1, we examine the spending reallocations-growth nexus as follows. First, notice
that due to exact multicollinearity caused by the fact that
∑m
j=1 si,j,t−x = 1, we need to
proceed by omitting at least one component share from the equation. If, for instance, the
share of component m, si,m,t−x, is omitted, it becomes
yi,t − yi,t−x = (α + ζm) yi,t−x + βhi,t−x +
m−1∑
j=1
(γj − γm)si,j,t−x +
m−1∑
j=1
(ζj − ζm)si,j,t−xyi,t−x
+ δei,t−x + z¯′i,tη + γm + νi + ξt + i,t.
(2)
Then, estimating Eq. 2, the marginal effect of si,j,t−x is obtained as
∂(yi,t − yi,t−x)
∂si,j,t−x
= (γj − γm) + (ζj − ζm)yi,t−x. (3)
Importantly, this is the difference of marginal effects of spending component j and m, thus
capturing the marginal growth effect of spending reallocations to the former component from
the latter, as a function of income levels. In what follows, we examine the effects of different
reallocation combinations, while considering the potential role of initial income levels.
3.2 Estimation strategy
To estimate the dynamic panel data model of Eq. 2, we follow the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) approach. The reasons for this choice are as follows. First, the framework
is flexible enough to accommodate our unbalanced panel. Second, it enables us to handle
29While we admit that it is more relevant to use labor force growth instead of (total) population growth,
using the former variable severely restricts the sample size, particularly for the low-income countries (LICs).
Thus, in line with other similar cross-country regressions in the literature which also cover LICs (e.g., Levine
et al. (2000)), we use the latter variable.
30In the robustness checks, we additionally control for demographic variables such as the fraction of the
population below 15 and above 65 years old. Further, we consider inflation rates, the degree of trade openness,
and the ratio of credit extended to the private sector to GDP too.
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country fixed effects.31 Third, it helps us address potential endogeneity of public spending
variables through the use of internal instruments (i.e., instruments based on lagged values
of those variables), complementing the use of period averages and the lag structure.
While the GMM approach yields consistent estimators, the original ‘difference’ GMM
estimators developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) may suffer
from finite sample biases. These biases arise particularly when time series are persistent.
In fact, Bond et al. (2001) suggest that such biases are likely to be large in the context of
empirical growth models, as output tends to be a largely persistent variable. They therefore
recommend the use of the alternative ‘system’ GMM estimators developed by Arellano and
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which augment the difference estimator by
combining the regression in differences with the regression in levels in a system in which the
two equations are separately instrumented. We use this system procedure in what follows.32,33
Specifically, we treat the state variables of the model, initial output and human capital
(yi,t−x and ui,t−x), and the initial spending variables (ei,t−x and si,j,t−x) as predetermined
variables, while the other control variables are assumed as endogenous, unless specified oth-
erwise.34 In what follows, we avoid the problem of instrument proliferation by using only
31To handle fixed effects, we transform variables through ‘orthogonal deviations’ (Arellano and Bover
(1995)) rather than first differencing, because this transformation maximizes the sample size in our unbal-
anced panel.
32We considered the choice over difference and system GMM estimators explicitly in our context. Specif-
ically, focusing on the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (as in Bond et al. (2001) and Roodman
(2009a)), and comparing estimates based on these estimators to the range of estimates set by OLS levels and
fixed effects (the former as the upper bound and the latter as the lower bound of good estimates of the true
parameter), we found that the point estimate from using difference GMM often lies below the corresponding
fixed effects estimate, while the estimate from system GMM largely lies between the range. This suggests
that difference GMM is seriously biased downwards, i.e., even more biased than fixed effects estimates, while
system GMM appears to address this bias observed in difference GMM.
33Notably, some other works on fiscal policy and growth use the Mean-Group (MG) and/or Pooled Mean-
Group (PMG) estimators developed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. (1999), respectively
(e.g., Gemmell et al. (2011) and Arnold et al. (2011)). However, one potential disadvantage of using these
alternative approaches is that because the use of annual data is usually required (to have a large number of
time series observations), business cycle effects can be more problematic than in our 8-year framework. More
fundamentally, however, the fact that our highly disaggregated spending dataset is unbalanced practically
prohibits the use of these alternative estimators.
34That is, with the 8-year framework, we assume that i,t, the country-specific time-varying shocks from
year t − 7 to t, are uncorrelated with initial GDP, human capital, and fiscal variables in t − 8 and earlier,
while they are uncorrelated with the average of the other control variables from t− 15 to t− 8 and earlier.
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one lag as an internal instrument.35 To consider the validity of this system GMM approach,
we conduct various specification tests. The first is the Arellano-Bond test, whose purpose is
to examine the hypothesis that the error term is not serially correlated, which is implicitly
assumed in the orthogonality conditions. The second is the Hansen test, which checks the
overall validity of the various instruments of the system. The third is the difference-in-Hansen
test, which examines the validity of instruments used in the level part of the system.
4 Results
4.1 Spending reallocation effects without income level considered
As a benchmark, we first consider the growth effects of spending reallocations without taking
account of income levels, i.e., by assuming ζj = 0 for all j in Eq. 1. In this case, the regression
equation simplifies to (cf. Eq. 2)
yi,t− yi,t−x = αyi,t−x + βhi,t−x +
m−1∑
j=1
(γj − γm)si,j,t−x + δei,t−x + z¯′i,tη+ γm + νi + ξt + i,t, (4)
where a coefficient on spending item j, γj − γm, captures the reallocation effect to j from m,
independent of income levels.
Table 2 presents the estimation results using the CG-based dataset, with the 8-year frame-
work as a reference. For example, in Column (4), which includes the shares of education and
the composite of all the items except education and defense (denoted as ‘Rest excl. Financ-
ing comp/Total’) and thus omits defense, the coefficient on education spending captures the
growth effect of spending reallocation to education from defense. Specifically, the coefficient
of 0.85, being statistically significant at the 5 percent level, indicates that a 1 percentage
point rise in the share of education spending throughout an 8-year period, financed by a
35As discussed in Roodman (2009b), the key issue of having “too many” instruments is that it weakens
the Hansen test of the instruments’ joint validity (mentioned below). Although there is little formal guidance
on how many instruments are “too many”, a rule of thumb is that the number of instruments should not
outnumber individual units in the panel (Roodman (2009a)).
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corresponding fall in defense spending, is associated with a 0.85 percentage points increase
in the growth rate over the period, or an approximately 0.11 percentage points annual rise.
Columns (5), (6), and (10), which investigate the effects of education spending, when it is
financed by health, social protection, and transport spending, respectively, show that reallo-
cations from these components also significantly promote growth.36 Turning to the remaining
combinations, reallocations to defense and social protection from health significantly foster
growth (Column (1) and (3)), while reallocations to defense and social protection, away from
transport spending, also exhibit positive growth effects.
36In Column (10), the coefficient on transport spending is significantly negative when education spending
is omitted. This implies that a spending reallocation towards education from transport fosters growth.
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Regarding the other variables, the ratio of total spending to GDP mostly has an insignif-
icant growth effect. This happens because the level effect of total spending is offset by a
change in other fiscal components to satisfy the government budget constraint. For instance,
to the extent that a rise in possibly growth-promoting total spending is financed by a rise
in distortionary taxes, the combined effect can be insignificant. Next, the coefficient on the
initial GDP per capita, expressed in percent, is significantly negative, being consistent with
the conditional convergence hypothesis.37 The years of schooling, a proxy for initial human
capital, has a significantly positive effect in most cases. Lastly, the effect of the ratio of in-
vestment to GDP is significantly positive, while the population’s growth rate has a negative
effect, though insignificant. To note, the diagnostic test results support the use of system
GMM estimators.38
Table 3: Spending reallocations and growth: using CG-GG-based dataset
Share increased
Defense Health Socprot Education Transport
Share decreased
Defense n/a − − +** −***
Health n/a + +*** −
Socprot n/a +*** −**
Education n/a −***
Transport n/a
Notes: + (−): growth enhancing (reducing). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. For the full results and explanation of
specifications, see Table 6 in the Online Appendix C.
Table 3 summarizes the reallocation effects using the CG-GG-based dataset instead.
There, each of the five columns (rows) designates the component whose spending share is
increased (decreased) and each cell gives respective reallocation effects. To ease presentation,
we only show the sign of the effects, i.e., + (−) indicating growth promoting (reducing)
37The convergence rates of around 6-7 percent over the 8 years imply annual average convergence rates of
about 0.8-0.9 percent, somewhat smaller relative to the often-reported rates of around 2 percent. This may
be because we consider here a rather heterogeneous groups of countries.
38First, the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) indicates the absence of serial correlation of the error term.
Second, the Hansen test validates the instruments used both in the difference and level parts of the system
as a whole. Third, the difference Hansen test, which examines the validity of instruments used in the level
part of the system as a whole, also supports the use of system GMM estimators.
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effects, with star superscripts in case they are statistically significant.39 (See Table 6 in the
Online Appendix C for full results.) Notice that the results on education and transport
components still stand. That is, the former promotes growth when it is financed by a fall
in all the other individual components, while reallocations away from the latter also show
the positive effects, except when reallocated to health.40 However, the positive effects of
reallocations away from health (to defense and social protection), observed with the CG-
dataset, are absent, indicating the potential importance of taking into account the effects of
decentralization in health spending.41
Robustness checks We now examine the robustness of the above results. First, we change
the decentralization threshold from 50 to 75 percent, meaning that if the ratio of spending
at the CG to GG level is less than 75 percent even in one of the components in a country, we
replace the entire CG-level data with GG-level data for the country. This measure mitigates
the potential bias from decentralization, albeit it reduces the number of observations further.
Second, we form initial spending figures by 3- (and 5-year), instead of 4-year, averages. That
is, for the 1980-87 period, for example, an average is taken over 1978-80 (1976-80), rather
than 1977-80, as long as at least one observation is available over the years. The former
measure helps improve the consistency of the data across periods, while the latter increases
the number of observations. Third, we control for demographic variables, because while
aging societies tend to raise health and social protection spending, this demographic feature,
39Notice that focusing on the upper triangular part of the matrix suffices, due to the symmetric nature
of the analysis. That is, if increasing item A and decreasing item B promotes growth, decreasing A and
increasing B suppresses it.
40Additionally, we report that education spending tends to be more growth enhancing than the spending
items which are not highlighted here. Specifically, we find that spending reallocations to education from
general public services and the rest of economic affairs other than transport and communication exhibit
significantly positive growth effects, for both the CG- and CG-GG-based datasets. The detailed estimation
results are available from the authors upon request.
41Put simply, differences in results between Table 2 and Table 3 are only related to the significance of
coefficients involving health spending reallocations. That is, while the signs of all possible reallocations
are the same across alternative datasets in both tables, only under the CG-based dataset do reallocations
to health, from defense and social protection, have a significantly negative effect. Given recent trends in
decentralization of health spending, particularly in advanced economies, these differences in results may not
be surprising.
18
implying a smaller fraction of the working age population between 15-65 years old, can affect
growth negatively (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)). Specifically, we add the percentages
of the population below 15 and above 65 years old to the reference specification.42 Lastly,
we change the way the entire sample period is divided, examining 5-year frameworks instead
(with the maximum of 8 observations per country).43
Results are summarized in Table 4.44 Overall, while spending reallocations to education
from all the other items tend to exhibit growth-promoting effects, the effects appear to be
particularly robust when reallocated from health and social protection. Meanwhile, reallo-
cations away from transport spending, toward the other components, may not necessarily
exhibit significantly positive effects, except when reallocated to education. Lastly, notice
that, although spending reallocations away from health to defense and social protection
show some sign of growth-promoting effects, they indeed do not appear robust to the use of
GG-based data.45
4.2 Role of income levels in the spending reallocation-growth nexus
Although the above analyses shed some light on the growth effects of public spending re-
allocations, they may mask the potentially important roles of income heterogeneity across
countries. Acknowledging this, we now estimate Eq. 2 with the interaction terms present.
Figure 1, using the estimation results based on CG-based dataset, graphically illustrates
how the marginal effects of spending reallocations change across the observed range of in-
come levels, for all the different reallocations considered above. (See Table 7 in the Online
Appendix C for the estimation results.)
42To avoid the issue of instrument proliferation, we treat these additional variables as exogenous.
43With the larger time dimension (i.e., 8 periods), the issue of instrument proliferation again arises, even
when only one lagged value is used as an internal instrument. Therefore, in this case, while still treating
investment rate and population growth rate as endogenous (and using one lag for instruments), we use the
option collapse of the command xtabond2 for Stata, for these variables.
44All the detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
45To note, we also examined the robustness by adding the extra controls often considered in growth
regressions, namely, inflation rates, the degree of trade openness, and the ratio of credit extended to private
sector to GDP. However, since the key results obtained here still stand, the result of this robustness check is
not shown for brevity.
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Table 4: Robustness checks: growth effects of spending reallocations
Share increased
Defense Health Socprot Education Transport
CG-GG-data with a 75 percent decentralization threshold
Share decreased
Defense n/a − − + −*
Health n/a + +*** −
Socprot n/a +*** −*
Education n/a −***
Transport n/a
CG (and CG-GG) data with initial spending as 3-year averages
Share decreased
Defense n/a −*(−) −(−) +**(+**) −(−*)
Health n/a +*(+) +***(+**) −(+)
Socprot n/a +**(+**) −(−)
Education n/a −**(−***)
Transport n/a
CG (and CG-GG) data with initial spending as 5-year averages
Share decreased
Defense n/a −***(−) −(−) +*(+) −**(−***)
Health n/a +**(+) +***(+***) −(−)
Socprot n/a +*(+**) −**(−***)
Education n/a −***(−***)
Transport n/a
CG (and CG-GG) data with demographic controls
Share decreased
Defense n/a −***(−) −(−) +**(+*) −**(−***)
Health n/a +**(+) +***(+**) −(−)
Socprot n/a +**(+**) −**(−***)
Education n/a −***(−***)
Transport n/a
CG (and CG-GG) data with 5-year periods
Share decreased
Defense n/a −(−*) +(+) +***(+**) −(−)
Health n/a +***(+*) +***(+***) +(+)
Socprot n/a +***(+*) −(−)
Education n/a −(−)
Transport n/a
Notes: + (−): growth enhancing (reducing). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. When using CG-GG data with a 75 percent
threshold (and without economic affairs disaggregated), results are based on 83 countries covering 171 observations. For the
case with initial spending as 3-year average (initial spending as 5-year average, demographic variables, 5-year periods) using
CG-based dataset without economic affairs disaggregated, results are based on 80 (83, 82, 84) countries covering 202 (224, 211,
354) observations. All the underlying estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
For example, the left sub-figure in the third row presents the marginal effect (solid line)
of a reallocation to education from health, together with the corresponding 90% confidence
intervals (dashed lines). Notice that the effects, rather independent of income levels (corre-
sponding to the insignificant coefficient on the interaction term), are significantly positive for
20
a wide range of the income levels. Specifically, the effects are significantly positive when the
log of real GDP p.c. is between 8.1 and 10.8, roughly corresponding to the middle- to high-
income range. (Incidentally, the histogram depicting the distribution of income levels shows
that about 80 percent of the entire observations are located within this region of positive
significance.) A similar comment can be made for the reallocation to education from social
protection and also from defense, albeit for the former finance source, the positive effects are
observed rather over the low- to middle-income range.46
46To acknowledge, when countries’ income levels are lower, social protection spending tends to be lower
and thus there is smaller room to be reallocated from. However, since our analysis focuses on the marginal
effects of reallocations, the results are still valid.
21
Figure 1: Effects of spending reallocations across income levels: using CG-based dataset
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Note: Solid (dashed) line represents a marginal effect (90% confidence interval).
Histogram describes the distribution of initial income.
Source: Authors' calculations
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Meanwhile, the sub-figures in the fourth and fifth rows describe the reallocation effects
towards transport, from all the other components. Notice that the marginal effects do exhibit
a distinct positive slope, consistent with the significantly positive coefficients on interaction
terms in all the cases. Relatedly, the effects are significantly negative primarily in the low-
income region (except for the case when it is financed by a fall in health spending), which
indicates that a reallocation away from transport, to items such as education, promotes
growth particularly in low-income countries. Overall, these findings from the interaction
analyses highlight the importance of income heterogeneity in the spending reallocations-
growth nexus, particularly when transport spending is involved. Lastly, Figure 3 in the
Online Appendix C indicates that a similar message can be drawn when using the CG-
GG-based dataset, although generally larger standard errors (associated with the smaller
number of observations) tend to narrow the income regions where the marginal effects are
significant.47
Examining reallocation effects using subsamples Next, to check the robustness of
the role of income levels, we estimate the growth effects of spending reallocations using
subsamples of the entire sample, without interaction terms. Specifically, the following two
subsets are considered: one without “poor” countries (57 countries) and another without
the “very rich” ones (74 countries).48 Table 5 summarize the results on reallocation effects
47Running regressions with interaction terms using the CG-GG-based dataset requires a further restriction
of instrument counts, as implied by the Hansen statistic of almost unity for the majority of the regressions.
Thus, when running these regressions, we use the option collapse (as mentioned above), for investment rate
and population growth rate, while still using only one lag for instruments. The detailed results on CG-GG-
based dataset is available from the authors upon request.
48We take the following procedure to classify countries into rich and poor. First, for each of the 42 years
(1970-2011, the period our fiscal dataset spans), we sort the 183 countries available in the IMF’s World
Economic Outlook (WEO) according to their GDP per capita level (PPP prices) into two groups: the upper
and lower half. Then, counting the number of times each country appears in those groups during the sample
period, we classify countries that appear in the upper half most frequently as rich and the remaining countries
as poor. Next, to define “very rich” countries, we take a similar approach, sorting the 183 countries into
10 equal groups. Then, we classify countries that appear in the top 10 percentile most frequently as very
rich. The reason for choosing this threshold of 10 percentile (say, rather than 25 percentile) is to ensure that
sufficient countries/observations are left in the remaining sample.
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for both subsets.49 First, the upper sub-table shows that when poor countries are excluded,
reallocations towards transport spending tend to exhibit positive effects, albeit mostly in-
significant, unlike significantly negative effects often observed when considering the entire
sample (cf. Table 2 and Table 6). In contrast, the lower sub-table reveals that when using
a sample without very rich countries, the negative effects are restored. Indeed, these results
appear consistent with the ones from the interaction analyses. Second, reallocations towards
education from health and social protection exhibit positive effects in both subsamples, im-
plying that these reallocations tend to have growth-promoting effects over a wide range of
countries. Again, this is in line with the results from the interaction analyses.
Table 5: Growth effects of spending reallocations in subsamples of countries
Share increased
Defense Health Socprot Education Transport
CG (and CG-GG) data without poor countries
Share decreased
Defense n/a −(−) +(−) +(+) +(+)
Health n/a +(+) +***(+**) +***(+)
Socprot n/a +(+**) +(+)
Education n/a −(−)
Transport n/a
CG (and CG-GG) data without very rich countries
Share decreased
Defense n/a −(−) −(−) +**(+) −***(−***)
Health n/a +(+) +***(+**) −(−)
Socprot n/a +**(+***) −**(−***)
Education n/a −***(−***)
Transport n/a
Notes: + (−): growth enhancing (reducing). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. For the case where economic affairs is
not disaggregated into transport and others, the number of observation without poor (very rich) countries with CG-based
dataset is 159 (172) from 57 (74) countries. All the underlying estimation results are available from the authors upon
request.
Further robustness checks We further examined the robustness of the results on the
role of income levels, by repeating some of the checks conducted above (cf. Table 4), for both
interaction and subsample analyses.50 Specifically, we examined the use of CG- and CG-GG-
based datasets with initial spending as 5-year averages and also the addition of demographic
49To address instrument proliferation, we use here the option collapse for investment rate and population
growth rate. The detailed estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
50All the test results are available from the authors upon request.
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variables.51 In short, the interaction analyses indicate that the growth-promoting effects of
reallocations to education from health and social protection tend to be rather indifferent to
income levels, whereas reallocations away from transport to others such as education promote
growth primarily in low-income regions. The subsample analyses yield consistent results.
4.3 Why does income heterogeneity matter?
However, why do spending reallocations towards transport, a proxy for infrastructure, have
particularly weak growth-promoting effects in low income countries, while education does not
exhibit such effects? Our basic conjecture is that, while both spending items have potentially
strong growth-promoting effects (e.g., the former through promoting the productive efficiency
of private firms; the latter through enhancing human capital), the efficiency of infrastructure
spending may be particularly susceptible to the low-quality of governance often observed in
these countries.52 In our view, there may be at least two bases for this conjecture.
To explain the first, it is useful to acknowledge that infrastructure projects tend to be
capital intensive, unlike education spending for which its largest share can be rather classi-
fied as current spending, such as public wages for teachers. Then, as emphasized by Tanzi
and Davoodi (1997) and Keefer and Knack (2007), since capital spending is often a con-
venient vehicle for government officials’ rent seeking (e.g., in the form of commissions from
private firms seeking for public capital projects), the efficiency of this type of spending can
easily be compromised, particularly when officials are not properly constrained. Meanwhile,
in the case of wages, there is less room for rent seeking by officials, because they tend to be
predetermined outside officials’ discretion. Therefore, the degree of political constraints, a
key aspect of governance quality, may influence the effectiveness of infrastructure spending
in a particularly critical manner. Second, the quality of bureaucracy in general, another key
aspect of governance, can be a particularly important determinant of the efficiency of infras-
51Given that the interaction approach requires more predetermined variables, i.e., interaction terms, and
that the subsample analyses severely restrict the sample size, certain tests, particularly the ones causing the
issue of instrument proliferation, are difficult to conduct.
52We define governance as the general manner in which authority is exercised in a country.
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tructure spending. This is because, in general, a proper conduct of infrastructure projects
often involves a particularly long-lasting, potentially complicated, management processes, in-
cluding appraisal, selection, implementation, and evaluation (see Dabla-Norris et al. (2012)
for detailed public investment management processes). Therefore, for a project to be carried
out efficiently, a high-quality bureaucracy, which is capable of managing these potentially
complicated processes properly, is often required. To clarify, while other public spending
components should also benefit from such strong bureaucracies, the particular complexity
of infrastructure projects may render their successful completion more dependent on their
presence.
Is there any evidence for this conjecture? While providing thorough evidence is beyond
the scope of this paper, we present here suggestive evidence for the possible importance of
governance quality, particularly in the effects of infrastructure spending. For this purpose,
we consider the following interaction model similar to Eq. 1:
yi,t−yi,t−x = αyi,t−x+βhi,t−x+
m∑
j=1
γjsi,j,t−x+
m∑
j=1
ζjsi,j,t−xgi,t−x+λgi,t−x+δei,t−x+z¯′i,tη+νi+ξt+i,t,
(5)
where the key difference is that this model rather highlights interactions between the shares
of spending components, si,j,t−x and the governance variable, gi,t−x. Following works such
as Keefer and Knack (2007), the governance level is proxied by a composite of institutional
indicators provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).53,54
53The indicators used are law and order, corruption, bureaucracy quality, and investment profile. The
governance proxy is then created as the unweighted addition of these indicators. (We used investment profile,
as a substitute for ‘the risk of expropriation and of repudiation of contracts by government’ used by Keefer
and Knack (2007), since this variable is no longer available in the recent versions of the dataset.) A similar
ICRG index is also used by Shi and Svensson (2006), particularly to capture the level of rents extracted by
politicians whilst in power.
54Consistent with the spending shares, we use initial governance proxies in each period. To note, since
ICRG index often becomes available only since 1984, to ensure that we cover here at least 4 (8-year) periods
since the 1980-87 period, we extrapolate the oldest available figure to 1980, by assuming that governance
level did not change over the few years.
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Figure 2: Effects of spending reallocations across governance levels
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Note: Solid (dashed) line represents a marginal effect (90% confidence interval).
Histogram describes the distribution of governance level.
Source: Authors' calculations
To proceed, we address again multicollinearity by omitting (at least) one spending share.
For simplification, we do not specify the financing factor here.55 That is, by defining item m
as the composite of all the spending items except item j, and omitting this composite, we
estimate
yi,t − yi,t−x = αyi,t−x + βhi,t−x + (γj − γm)si,j,t−x + (ζj − ζm)si,j,t−xgi,t−x + (λ+ ζm)gi,t−x
+ δei,t−x + z¯′i,tη + γm + νi + ξt + i,t.
(6)
Then, the marginal growth effect of spending share j, (γj − γm) + (ζj − ζm)gi,t−x, captures
the effect of spending j, relative to the one of the composite of all the remaining items, m,
as a function of the governance level.
55This is to deal with the fact that the use of ICRG makes country coverage and observations smaller.
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Figure 2 describes how the effects of education and infrastructure (transport) spending
change across the observed range of governance levels, where a larger value corresponds to
the better-quality of governance. (See Table 8 in the Online Appendix C for the underly-
ing estimation results.) The lower sub-figures suggest that for both CG- and CG-GG-based
datasets, the effects of infrastructure spending, relative to all the other spending items, are
increasing in the governance quality, consistent with the significantly positive coefficients on
the interaction terms in the respective regressions. Relatedly, the effects are negatively signif-
icant in the low-quality governance region. Meanwhile, the upper sub-figures show that the
growth-promoting effects of education spending are rather unaffected by governance quality,
in line with the insignificant coefficients on the interaction terms.56 Thus, the implication
is that, the above finding of weak growth effects of infrastructure spending in low-income
countries is potentially driven by low-quality governance, as often observed in these countries.
5 Concluding Remarks
Having examined the effects of public spending reallocations on growth, we found that re-
allocations towards education, from health and social protection, robustly promote growth
across a wide range of countries’ income levels. However, income heterogeneity matters in the
spending reallocations-growth nexus, particularly when infrastructure spending is involved.
Specifically, only when income levels are low, reallocations away from this spending, to items
such as education, enhance growth. This happens because while the growth-promoting effects
of education spending tend to prevail across different income levels, the effects of infrastruc-
ture spending exhibit a positive association with them. However, the fundamental reason
why infrastructure spending has particularly weak growth-promoting effects in low-income
countries may be that inefficiencies caused by their low-quality of governance, exemplified by
unconstrained officials’ rent-seeking behavior, mitigate the positive effects of this spending.
56Further, we report that none of the effects of the other spending items, i.e., defense, health, and social
protection, exhibits a clear positive association with governance level, as infrastructure spending does.
28
Our findings have various policy implications. First, while governments may attempt to
foster growth through public spending reallocations under different circumstances (say, when
adopting fiscal austerity measures), at least from a growth perspective, they may wish to
increase education spending and instead curb spending in other categories such as health
and social protection. Next, particularly in low-income countries, increasing infrastructure
spending through reallocations does not appear to be a growth-promoting policy. Rather,
to the extent that low-quality governance is weakening the effects of this spending in these
countries, promoting institutional reforms to restrain officials’ rent-seeking opportunities in
public investment management may be all the more beneficial to them.
However, one important caveat is in order regarding policy implications. That is, despite
its undeniable importance, economic growth is not the only criterion that a government uti-
lizes in determining the composition of public spending. While this paper focuses on growth,
there are other potential elements, such as employment and income inequality, that are of
critical importance. Indeed, although social protection spending may not be growth enhanc-
ing, it may help reduce income inequality. Therefore, from a broader policy perspective, it is
important to consider the effects of spending reallocation policies on these other key elements
of economic well-being as well. A careful examination of these effects thus appears to be a
fruitful topic for future research.
Finally, another possible topic for future research is to carefully examine the role of
political and economic freedom in the relation between public spending and growth. It is
possible that these freedom concepts, the former defined as the general public’s rights which
guarantee their own political participation, and the latter as their rights to pursue their own
economic decisions without excessive regulations, may play a different role in the growth
effects of different spending items. For example, while this paper suggests that the low
quality of governance is associated with the weak growth effects of infrastructure spending,
this may also indicate the important role of political freedom in this association. Further
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investigation of the possible role of these freedom concepts may shed brighter light on the
conditions under which different public spending policies have growth-promoting effects.
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